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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH
A. E. UPTON,

Appellant,
-vs.HEISELT CONSTRUCTION COMpANY, L. H. HEISELT and
ANNIE RAY HEISELT, Administratrix of the Estate of L. H.
HEISELT, Deceased.
Respondent.

Case No.
8240

Appellant's Brief
The Order of the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, made and entered on June 28,
1954, was that the "judgment entered in the above
entitled case on the 15th day of J nne, 1948, be and t:Q.e
same hereby is, permanently stayed and that execution
shall not be issued upon the judgment herein rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, L. H.
Heiselt." ( R. P. 74, 75.) This appeal is taken from that
Order.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was originally commenced on June 9,
1943, as a foreclosure proceeding on a real estate mortgage and note on which L. H. Heiselt was an endorser.
The note was dated ~lay 15, 1936, and was in the amount
of $3,000.00. L. H. Heiselt filed an answer and crosscomplaint in which he prayed for affirmative relief in
the form of a partnership accounting. This case was
tried and judgment was entered against L. H. Heiselt
personally on June 19, 1948, for $3,000.00 with $1,798.75
interest, $300.00 attorneys' fee and costs. ( R. P. 1, 2.)
Defendant, L. H. Heiselt, appealed to the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah, which appeal resulted in the judgment of the District Court being affirmed. The opinion
of the Court is found in 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945, Upton
vs. H eiselt Construction Company. At no time ~id L. H.
Heiselt plead or attempt to prove that he had been
adjudicated a bankrupt in proceedings in the State of
Colorado.
The defendant, L. H. Heiselt, died on March 27, 1951,
in the State of Colorado. (R. P. 18.) Annie Ray Heiselt,
wife of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, filed and qualified as
administratrix in the domiciliary probate proceedings in
Conejos County, State of Colorado, in July or August,
1951. (R. P. 18.)
That the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, herein duly filed
with the County Court of Conejos County, Colorado, in
probate in the Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, the
2
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claim based on the judgment issued in his favor in this
case. (R. P. 21, 41.) The claim was denied by the administratrix. (R. P. 22.) The question of allowance of
the claim or disallowance of the claim in the probate
proceedings in Conejos County, Colorado, has not been
decided. ( R. P. 22, 40, 44.)
On the 24th day of September, 1952, Annie Ray
Heiselt as administratrix of the Colorado Estate of L. H.
Heiselt, filed a petition with the Third Judicial District
Court of the State of Utah, asking the court to stay
execution on the judgment heretofore entered by the
said Third Judicial District Court against L. H. Heiselt
and which judgment was affirmed by this court. (R. P.
9.) Objection was raised that the Colorado administratrix was not qualified to appear before the Utah Court
which objection was granted and the motion was denied.
(R. P. 10, 11.) Thereafter, Annie Ray Heiselt instituted
ancillary probate proceedings in the Third Judicial District Court for the State of Utah, and on March 25, 1953,
was appointed ancillary administratrix by the Utah
Court. ( R. P. 12, 36, 37.) She moved the Third Judicial
District Court to substitute her as administratrix of
the Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deeeased, as defendant in
the above entitled matter, which motion was allowed.
(R. P. 12, 13, 41.) Thereafter, the substituted defendant,
Annie Ray Heiselt as administratrix, moved the Third
Judicial District Court for a permanent stay of execution against the judgment made and entered against the
said L. H. Heiselt in this case. (R. P. 12, 13.)
The defendant introduced in evidence a ''Discharge
3
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in Bankruptcy,'' from the Bankruptcy Court for the State
of Colorado, dated the 14th day of January, 1949, of his
scheduled allowable and provable debts under Section
75 (s) of the Bankruptcy Act. (Ex. No.2.) It is claimed
by the defendant that the Discharge bars recovery on
the judgment by A. E. Upton.
It was stipulated that the testimony of Annie Ray
Heiselt given at the original hearing when she attempted
to appear in the Utah Court as the Colorado administratrix, be allowed as evidence in the new hearing. (R. P.
41, 42.) After argument and the submission of documentary evidence, the appellant herein requested additional time from the court to obtain from the Bankruptcy
Court of .the State of Colorado, certified copies of the
.
bankruptcy schedules. These schedules were introduced
in evidence which showed that the judgment involved in
this case was not scheduled. (Ex. lA.) Additional time
was then requested by the defendant herein to obtain
further documentary evidence from the bankruptcy :files
which additional time was allowed by· the court. Thereafter, upon a further hearing and argument before the
District Court, additional time was granted so that the
plaintiff could take the deposition of A. E. Upton and
the substituted defendant could take the deposition of
Rafael J. Moses and Ernest Upton, all of whom are
residents of the State of Colorado. (R. P. 46, 47.)
Thereafter, a further hearing was held and the Third
Judicial District Court made and entered its order dated
4
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the 28th day of June, 1954, granting the motion for stay
of execution on the judgment. (R. P. 74, 75.)
I.J. H. Heiselt filed his original petition in bankruptcy
in the United States District Court for the District of
·Colorado, on October 23, 1940, under Section 75 ( a-r) of
the Bankruptcy Act, which resulted in the failure of the
creditors to reach an agreement. (Ex. 2A Sheet (16)).
On July 7, 1941, he was adjudicated a bankrupt under
Section 75 (s) of the Bankruptcy Act. (Ex. A P. 9.)
L. H. Heiselt did not schedule with the Bankruptcy Court,
his obliga.tion as an endorser on the note of May 15, 1936,
upon 'vhich note the judgment in this case was entered.
(Ex. 1A.) There appears on the schedule of debts of
the bankrupt a debt of $30.00 owed by the bankrupt
debtor to the plaintiff, A. E. Upton. There also appears
on the schedule a debt owed by the bankrupt to the N ationa! City Bank of Denver, a Colorado Corporation of
which A. E. Upton was President. (Ex. 1A.)
On November 16, 1940, the Conciliation Commissioner in Bankruptcy at Saguache, Colorado, issued the
"Notice of the First Meeting of Creditors", setting the
first date of the first meeting of creditors as December
21, 1941. (Ex. D, Sheet ( 4)). There was a re-reference
of the said bankruptcy matter by the United States District Judge from the Conciliation Commissioner in Saguache, Colorado, to Conciliation Commissioner, Hugh
A. Crawford at Alamosa, Colorado. (Ex. D, P.1.) Thereafter, the Conciliation Commissioner on March 8, 1941,
issued a ''Notice of the First Meeting of Creditors under

5
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Section 75.'' On March 17, 1941, the Conciliation Commissioner at Alamosa, Colorado, issued a ''Notice of the
First Meeting of Creditors under Section 75.'' In the
aforesaid notice of March 8, 1941, the date of the meeting
\Vas de signa ted as March 17, 1941. In the said notice of
March 17, 1941, the date of the meeting was March 29,
1941. The first meeting of creditors was held on the said
dates, March 17, 1941, and March 29, 1941. (Ex. D, P. 1.)
A. E. Upton claims that he did not receive any of the
notices. (Ex. 4A, P. 7.) (Ex. 7A, Sheet (4).)
The name and address of A. E. Upton and a description of the $30.00 item did not appear in the list required
under Section 75 (e) Bankruptcy Act to be attached to
the ''Notice of First Meeting of Creditors'' issued on
November 16, 1940. (Ex. 5A, P. 4, 5.)
The bankruptcy proceedings show that a creditors
meeting held in Alamosa, Colorado, on ~larch 29, 1941,
that Rafael J. Moses, Attorney of Alamosa, entered an
appearance for A. E. Upton. (Ex. 7A, Sheets 1, 2, 3.) A.
E. Upton denies that the appearance was made and denies
that the_ said Rafael J. Moses was ever given authority
to represent him at the proceedings. (Ex. 4A, P. 6, 7.)
A. E. Upton was residing in California and away
from his home and office in Denver, Colorado, from January 1941, to the latter part of May, 1941. (Ex. 4A, P. 7, 8.)
On October 28, 1947, the defendant, L. H. Heiselt,
petitioned the Bankruptcy Court to require the plaintiff,
6
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.A.. E. Upton, to account to L. H. Heiselt for certain
alleged transactions, 'vhich petition contained the same
facts and parties set forth in the defendant's, L. H. Heiselt 's, answer, cross-complaint and counter-claim filed
in this action. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 16 to 21 inc.) That said
defendant, L. H. Heiselt, also instituted an action in the
District Court in and for the City and County of Denver,
State of Colorado, involving the same facts and parties
set forth iu his answer, cross-complaint and counterclaim filed in this action. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 22, 23.) On
November 13, 1947, the plaintiff herein ans,vered the said
petition of L. H. Heiselt of October 28, 1947, in the
bankruptcy proceedings by a motion to dismiss said
petition. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 22, 23.) On March 15, 1948,
the Conciliation Commissioner, Frank McClaughlin, issued ''Findings and Decision on Motion of A. E. Upton
to Dismiss the Petition of the Debtor asking for Certain
Relief in Relation to Property in the State of Utah;"
and that the Consilia tion Commissioner ruled that the
stay proceedings under Bankruptcy Act Section 75, had
expired, that the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, had not violated
the ''Stay Order'' through any of his actions in the Utah
Courts and that the Utah Court's jurisdiction had attached, and he therefore denied the petition of the bankrupt debtor. (Ex. 4.)
On January 14, 1949, L. H. Heiselt was g1ven a
Discharge in Bankruptcy of his scheduled and provable
debts. The Obligation on which the judgment in this
case is based was not among the scheduled debts.

7
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On March 6, 1951, L. H. Heiselt petitioned the Colorado F~deral Bankruptcy Court to reopen the bankruptcy
proceedings for consideration of the matter now before
this court and, another Utah case involving the same
parties. (Ex. 3A, Sheets 1 to 5 inc.) The Federal Bankruptcy Court of Colorado, after a hearing, referred the
matter to the Conciliation Commission for ~earing and
report and decision. (Ex. 3A, Sheet 7.) Thereafter, by
stipulation of all parties the two cases of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Utah,
No. 84208, which was the subject .matter mentioned in
the said petition, and No. 70573, the subject matter of
the case here at bar, were both to be considered by the
Conciliation Commissioner (Ex. A, P. 45) and reported
to the Federal District Court Judge and that in said
consideration, certified copies of the pleadings in both
cases, to-wit: Third District Court of the State of Utah,
cases 70573 and 84208 were filed with the Conciliation
Commissioner. (E~. 3A, Sheets 9 to 35 inc.) The petition
of the bankrupt debtor, L. H. Heiselt, to reopen was
denied. (Ex. A.) A report was made to Judge Knous
of the United States District Court in and for the State
-of Colorado. Thereafter, and after the time of appeal
from said order, Judge Knous issued an order affirming
the report and decision of the Conciliation Commissioner.
(Ex. 's A and B.) The defendant, L. H. Heiselt, did not
appeal from the said decisions and orders. The action
aforesaid numbered 84208 of the Third District Court,
in favor of plaintiff, A. E. Upton, was appealed to the
Utah State Supreme Court -and affirmed by the Supreme

8
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Court and is reported in 223 P. 2d 428; that the judgment
in the case 70573 in favor of plaintiff, A. E. Upton vs.
L. H. H eiselt personally, 'vas appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court and affirmed and is reported in 116 Utah
83, 208 P. 2d 945.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
A. THE COLORADO PROBATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION AS IT ATTACHED PRIOR TO TI-lE
PETITION TO STAY EXECUTION ON THE
JUDGMENT AND THE UTAH COURT ERRED
IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION.
B. THE CONTROVERSY IS RES ADJUDICATA.
1-The Judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is
Final.
2-Relief Denied Defendant by Colora.do Bankruptcy
Court, And Its Decisions Are Final.

C. F AlLURE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT L.
H. HEISEL.T TO SCHEDULE DEBT OWING
CREDITOR, IS FATAL TO HIS MOTION TO
STAY EXECUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF
NOTICE OR ACTUAL l(NOWLEDGE.
1-The Debt Was Not Scheduled.

2-A. E. Upton Did Not Receive Notice or Actua;l
Knowledge of the Proceedings in Bankruptcy in
T~me to Allow Him to Present His Claim.
9
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(a) He Did Not Receive a· Notice From the Court.
(b) He Did Not Atttthorize Rafael J. Moses to

Represent Him at the Creditors Jtleetin.g.
(c) A. E. Upton Did Not Receive .Actual Knowledge of the Bankruptcy Proceedings From
.Any Source in Time in Which to Perfect His
Claim.

D. THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IS
BASED WAS NOT A PROVABLE DEBT IN
BANKRUPTCY WHEN BANKRUPTCY WAS
INSTITUTED.
ARGUMENT
A. THE COLORADO PROBATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION AS IT ATTACHED PRIOR TO THE
PETITION TO STAY EXECUTION ON THE
JUDGMENT AND THE UTAH COURT ERRED
IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION.
After L. H. Heiselt died on March 27, 1951, his
Estate \vas filed for probate in the County Court of
Conejos County, State of Colorado. Annie Ray Heiselt,
his wife, was appointed and qualified as administratrix
for the administration of the Estate on August 6, 1951.
(Ex. 1.) The plaintiff, A. E. Upton, was therefore forced
to file his claim based on the money judgment herein in
the said Conejos County probate proceedings or lose his
claim. A. E. Upton, therefore, duly filed his claim in that

10
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proceeding and in due course the said administratrix
filed a disallo,vance thereof. (R. P. 20, 21, 22, 40, 41, 43.)
Thereafter, and on September 22, 1952, Annie Ray
Heisel t as the said administratrix in the Colorado proceedings, filed a motion in the case at bar to be substituted
as defendant in this case for the purpose of making a
motion to stay execution on the judgment by A. E. Upton,
the judgment creditor hereon. (R. P. 9.) The District
Court in this case, disallowed this motion. (R. P. 10.)
Thereafter, on March 27, 1953, said Annie Ray Heiselt
as said ancillary administratrix moved the court in this
case to be substituted as defendant in the place of L. H.
Heiselt and this motion was allowed (R. P. 16) and also
a motion of Annie Ray Heiselt to have the execution of
said judgment permanently stayed on the ground of a
discharge in bankruptcy issuing out of the District Court
of the United States in and for the State of Colorado,
was filed herein.

The jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court
of Utah, on the substituted defendant's Motion to Stay
Execution was resisted by the plaintiff through a motion
to strike on the ground that the Conejos County Probate
Court had previously acquired and assumed jurisdiction
of the subject matter. (R. P. 15.)
The claim filed by the plaintiff based on the said
money judgment is still before the County Court of
Conejos County, Colorado, for decision. (R. P. 21, 22,
37, 40, 44.)
11
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It is contended that the County Court of Conejos
County, Colorado, has jurisdiction and tha.t the Third
Judicial District Court of Utah, was in error in assuming
jurisdiction under the Motion to Stay Execution, and
disallowing the motion to strike ..
It is submitted that the County Court of Conejos
County, Colorado, is a court of competent jurisdiction to
decide the validity of the claim of A. E. Upton against
the Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, on the final money
judgment he obtained against L. H. Heiselt issuing out
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for the State
of Utah, and to decide any and all defenses thereto, subject only to the appellate authority from the said Colorado Court. Also, it is submitted that the said Colorado
\Court took cognizance of the matter of the Estate of L. H.
Heiselt, deceased, prior to the filing of the motion by
Annie Ray Heiselt in the matter now before this court.
Also, it is submitted that' the said Colorado Court has
jurisdiction and power to afford complete relief and has
the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy in respect to the claim of A. E. Upton based on the Utah judgment filed in the said Colorado Court. (Colorado National
Bank vs. JJfcCue, 249 Pac. 3, 5; 80 Colo. 55) cited below,
page 16 of this brief. Also, it is submitted that the actions
in the said Colorado Court and the court herein on the
'
said claim of A. E. Upton are between the same parties,
to-wit: A. E. Upton and L. H. Heiselt, through Annie
Ray Heiselt, as administratrix of the Estate of L. H.
Heiselt and substituted as defendant for L. H. Heiselt
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on the matter now before this court; that said actions
are on the same subject, and to test the same rights.
There is nothing in the evidence or questions in the
Motion instituted in the Utah District Court on September 22, 1952 by Annie Ray Heiselt that is not before the
Probate Court in Colorado, and that could not be decided
by the Colorado Court. In any event, it is contended
that the court administering the Estate is the proper
court to decide the claim and defenses thereto and not
the Utah District Court in the case at bar in these supplemental motions.

After the death of L. H. H eiselt, the judgment
creditor, A. E. Upton, could not have obtained execution
on. the judgment any place except where the probate proceedings of L. H. Heiselt's Estate wa.s instituted to-wit:
County Court of Conejos County, Colorado. Therefore,
any move by A. E. Upton to get satisfaction on his judgment against L. H. Heiselt in any other court, would have
rightly been resisted and A. E. Upton would have been
required to get satisfaction on his judgment by filing in
the County Court of Conejos County, Colorado, and there
he duly filed his claim against the Estate of L. H. Heiselt.
(R. P. 20, 21, 40, 41, 43.)
There has never been any attempt by the judgment
creditor, A. E. Upton, since the death of L. H. Heiselt,
to get execution on his judgment in a Utah Court.
Assume that A. E. Upton had not filed his judgment claim
in the County Court of Conejos County in the matter of
13
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L. H. Heiselt, deceased, in due time, the administratrix
would not have filed the motion she did in this court and
which is now here on appeal. Then the judgment creditor,
A. E. Upton, would have lost his remedy and any satisfaction on the judgm.ent.
Under the rule of comity, the administratrix should
not be allo,ved to switch about to other courts at the
expense and inconvenience of creditors, especially when
the creditors have gone to the expense and inconvenience
of filing their claims in the court the statute designates
as the proper court for the determination of the question
of claims against the Estate, and in which court the
Estate was and is filed for administration.
The fact that the administratrix filed and qualified
in the probate court in Colorado is an admission of that
court's jurisdiction over the administration of the deceased's Estate.
If there is any question of the jurisdiction of the
Colorado County Court it may be resolved by reference
to Oolorado Statutes Annotated, 1935, Vol. 2, Chap. 46,
Sections 120-198, and the Colorado case cited below, Colorado Nation.al Bank vs. McCue, page 16 of this brief.
The following authorities support the point, 21
C.J.S.~ Page 745 et sequa, Par. 492.

"Priority and Retention of Jurisdiction:
That court which first takes cognizance of an
action over which it. has jurisdiction and power to
afford complete r~l1ef has the exclusive right to
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dispose of the controversy without interference
from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in
\vhich similar actions are subsequently instituted
bet,veen the same parties seeking similar remedies
and involving the same questions.
''Where t'vo actions between the same parties,
on the same subject, and to test the same rights,
are brought in different courts having concurrent
jurisdiction, the court which first acquired jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction
and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no
court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere
'vith its action. This rule rests on comity and the
necessity of a voiding conflict in the execution of
judgments by independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably
lead to perpetual collision and be productive of
most calamitous results.
''The rule has been applied to proceedings in
different courts of concurrent probate jurisdiction,
and likewise to proceedings in a probate court, and
a court of equity, where the probate court has
assumed jurisdiction and nothing intervenes to
render such jurisdiction inadequate, and also
generally where a probate court and some other
state cottrt have concurrent jurisdiction of a particular matter or proceeding. (Italics ours.)
14 Am. J-ur., P. 435, Courts, Par. 243.
"Generally.-The principle is essential to the
proper and orderly administration of the laws;
and while its observance might be required on the
grounds of judicia.Z comity and courtesy, it does
n.ot rest upon such considerations exclusively, but
is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
da;ngerous conflicts of jurisdiction arnd of process.
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If interference ttnay come from one side, it may
from the other also, and what is begun may be
reciproca.ted ,indefinitely" (Italics ours.)

Par. 243, N. 18 reads :
"Courts must be cautious when dealing with a
conflict of jurisdiction. Metcalf Bros. v. Barker,
187 U.S. 165, 47 L.Ed. 122, 23 S.Ct. 67." (Italics
ours.)

See also 14 Am. J ur., Courts, Sec. 245, P. 437.
lJ!letcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165, 175; 47 L. Ed. 125,
32 S. Ct. 67.

'' . . . and Mr. Justice Grier said : It is a doctrine of law too long established to require a
citation of authorities, that, where a court has
jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause, and whether its
decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, till
reversed, is regarded a.s binding in. every other
court; a.nd that, where the jurisdiction of a court,
a.nd the right of a, plaintiff to prosecute his suit
in it, have once · attached, that right cannot be
arrested or taken away by proceedings in a;nother
court. These rules have· their foundation, not
merely in ·comity, but on necessity. For if one
may enjoin, the other may retort by injunction,
and thus the parties be without remedy; being
liable to a proc~ss for contempt in one, if they
dare to proceed In the other ... '' (Italics ours.)
Colo. Nat. Bank v. McCue, 249 Pac. 3, 5, 80 Colo. 55.

''The county court has jurisdiction to pass
upon the plaintiff's claim filed therein and is as
competent as the district court to det~rmine the
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validity of the property settlement contract.
Aside from this, the county court is the court
which has sole jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of claims against an estate during the process
of administration, and has the sole power to
classify the various allowed claims against the
estate into their proper division.''

Cole vs. Franklin Life Ins. Co., C.C.A. Texas, 93 F.
2d 620, 624.
''From the earliest days a statutory administration upon the estate of a deceased person in
Texas has been regarded as comprehensive and
all-embracing. From the earliest days it has been
continuously held that an administration begun
within the statutory limit draws to it exclusive
disposition of the entire estate of the deceased,
including all claims against it, and all those in
its favor. Under these authorities, where there
is an administration in the probate court, it is
only through the court that claims, secured or
unsecured, may be established and realized upon.''
After said judgment and appeal to the Supreme
Court of Utah, the defendant died and the administration of his Estate was duly and properly filed in the
County Court of Conejos County, Colorado, and the
judgment creditor, A. E. Upton, (Plaintiff appellant
herein) duly filed his claim based on said judgment in
the said probate proceedings in the Conejos County
Court and the administratrix duly entered disallowance
thereof and the decision on the said claim is still before
that court. Therefore, the Conejos County Court in
Colorado acquired full and complete jurisdiction of the
matter of the validity of the Claim of A. E. Upton based
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on the said judgment against the Estate of L. H. Heiselt
and that court is fully competent to adjudicate all questions thereon. The administratrix in that matter, who
is the substituted defendant appellee now before this
court, could have and still can present to the County
Court of Conejos County any and all of the defenses she
has presented in the matter which she has presented
under her motio11 in the matter now before this court.
Further, she has the right of appeal from the Colorado
Court as likewise does the judgment creditor, A. E.
Upton.
It is noted that this defendant, L. H. Heiselt, during
the litigation of this case, has on three occasions, to-wit:
On October 28, 1947, before the Bankruptcy Court (Ex.
2A, Sheets 16 to 21 inc.), on December 2, 1946, before
the District Court, City & County of Denver, Colorado,
(Ex. 2A, Sheet 23) and on March 6, 1951, before the
Bankruptcy Court (Ex. 3A) attempted to have these said
courts take conflicting jurisdiction of the very same litigation as in the case now before this court. Those courts
in each instance under the rules of the doctrine of comity
have stated that the Utah Court, prior to the judgment
in the Utah District Court on June 7th, 1948, and the
appeal from that judgment to the Utah Supreme Court
(116 Utah· 83, 208 P. 2d 945), had acquired jurisdiction
over the matter and each time the above courts refused
to assume conflicting jurisdiction in the rna tter.
It is submitted that the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for the State of Utah, in the
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matter of the substituted defendant's motion now before
this court should have ruled that prior jurisdiction over
the matter had previously been acquired, recognized and
assumed by the Conejos County Court, and should have
allowed the plaintiff's Motion to Strike and should not
have taken any jurisdiction in the matter under the defendant's lVIotion to Stay Execution.
B. THE CONTROVERS-Y IS RES ADJUDICATA.

1-The Judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is
Final.
The action upon which the judgment involved in
this case and on which the lower court stayed execution,
was commenced in the Third District Court in and for
Salt Lake County on June 9, 1943. The action 'vas against
the Heiselt Construction Company and L. H. Heiselt
whose administratrix is the defendant herein. The case
did not come before the court for trial until June, 1948,
and on June 7, 1948, judgment 'vas entered against L. H.
Heiselt personally, due to the fact that he was an endorser on a note which was secured by a mortgage of
real property. Thereafter, the case was appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court with the result that the judgment
of the District Court was affirmed. Upton vs. H eiselt
Construction Company, 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945.

L. H. Heiselt filed a Petition in Bankruptcy in the
United States District Court in and for the State of
Colorado, on the 21st day of October, 1940, under Section
75, Subdivision ( a-r) of Section 75 of the Bankruptcy
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Act, and he amended his petition so that he might come
under Section 75 (s). This was done on July 7, 1941. The
Automatic Stay Order issued under Subdivision (a-r)
of Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, terminated on July
7, 1941, when the debtor amended his petition to come
under Subdivision (s) of Section 75. (Ex. A, P. 9.)
On September 12, 1941, a judicial three year Stay
Order was issued by virtue of adjudication under 75 (s)
of the Bankruptcy Act. This judicial Stay Order expired
on September 13, 1944. (Ex. A, P. 11.)
As heretofore mentioned, the action herein against
Heiselt was commenced on June 9, 1943, which was within
the period of the judicial Stay Order of September 12,
1941. The defendant, L. H. Heiselt, answered the complaint of the plaintiff herein, A. E. Upton, and at the
same time filed a counter-claim asking for affirmative
relief. He did not plead the bankruptcy proceedings in
his answer. (Ex. 3A, Sheets 13 to 16 inc.)
The law is clear that in order for the bankrupt to
take advantage of a Stay Order, it must be pleaded
specially as a defense to the action. 6 Am. Jur. (Ba;nkruptcy), Par. 319:
''An application to a state court for a stay of
a pending action against a bankrupt to which the
bankrupt is entitled under Sec. 11 (a) (11 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 29 (a), F.C.A. Title 11 Sec. 29 (a) is made
by pleading, which is proper under the state
practice.''
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Thereafter, when the case was brought up for trial
in 1948, the fact that L. H. Heiselt was before the Bankruptcy Court in the State of Colorado, was never presented to the trial court nor was it presented to the
Supreme Court of Utah. The District Court was allowed
to enter judgment against Heiselt and the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, which judgment became final. At
no time during the pendency of the appeal did L. H.
Heiselt either seek to have the District Court request a
remanding of the case so that it might entertain a motion
to vacate its judgment or to ask leave to amend the
complaint and raise the issue of bankruptcy. At no time
during the pendency of the appeal did L. H. Heiselt ask
this court to dismiss the appeal so as to restore jurisdiction to the District Court under which it could entertain a motion to vacate its judgment and for leave to
amend the complaint.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah was
handed down on July 13, 1949. The alleged bar of the
bankruptcy proceedings in the State of Colorado was
not raised before the Utah Courts until 1951. (R. P.
4, 5, 6, 7.)
It is elemental that a discharge in bankruptcy must
be pleaded in order to be a defense, H el1ns vs. Holmes
(C.A. 4th), 129 F. 2d 263, 141 A.L.R. 1367.
Although it is admitted that at the time the judgment
was obtained in this case, L. H. Heiselt had not yet been
given his discharge as a bankrupt; however, he had
21
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pre~riously been adjudicated a bankrupt on J nly 7, 1941.
(Ex. A, P. 9.) In view of the fact that he had been adjudicated a bankrupt, the Utah Court should have been so
advised if the subsequent defense of a discharge in
bankruptcy was to be asserted. In 6 Am. Jur. (Bankruptcy), Page 1025, we find the follo,ving statement:
''The normal as well as the safe practice on the
p·a.rt of a. defendant in an action pending at the
time he was adjudicated in bankruptcy is to appear, plead the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, and ask for a continuance or stay of
the action until he can obtain and plead his discharge.''
The question of the failure of a bankrupt to schedule
his debt and his failure to plead the bankruptcy proceedings i11 a law action such as we have in this case,
was discussed by the Mass. Court in Parker vs. 1l!lurphy,
215 Mass. 72, 102 N.E. 85.
In that case, the plaintiff asked for relief from a
judgment secured by the defendant against him on the
ground that the judgment was barred by the plaintiff's
discharge in bankruptcy. An action in law on three
promissory notes was brought by the defendant against
the plaintiff. Thereafter, while the action was pending,
the plaintiff, on appeal, after filing a petition in the
Bankruptcy Court was adjudged a bankrupt. The fact
·of bankruptcy was not called to the attention of the court
nor pleaded in the law action. ,Judgment was entered in
favor of the defendant against the plaintiff on the notes.
Later, the plaintiff received his discharge in bankruptcy.
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The plaintiff then asked for relief from the judgment.
The court decided the ease against the bankrupt on the
grounds that the bankrupt had not duly scheduled the
obligation and that the creditor did not have notice or
actual kno,vledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. However, in discussing the obligation of the bankrupt 1n
reference to pleading the bankruptcy, the court said:
''It is established that a "rrit of audita querela
'vill not avail a complaining party who has a
legal opportunity of defense, or when the alleged
\Vrongful judgment from 'vhich he seeks release is
attributable to his own neglect ... Nevertheless
in the simple action at law upon a claim to which
a discharge in bankruptcy "\\rould be a bar, ... the
usual procedure is for the bankrupt to plead the
pendency of the bankrupt proceedings and ask for
a continuance until he can obtain and plead his
discharge.''
See also Berry Clothing Co. 1.:s .. Shotnick, 249 Mass.
459, 144 N.E. 392.

In Woodruff v. Heiser, C.C.A. Okla. 1945, 150 Fed.
2d 869, reversed on other grounds, Heiser v. W oodrtt/f,
66 S. Ct. 853, 327 U. S. 726, 90 L. Ed. 970, at 976; rehearing denied 66 S. Ct~ 1335, 328 U. S. 879, 90. L. Ed.
1647, it is held:
"But we are aware of no principle of law or
equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal
court of the salutary principle of res adjudicata,
which is founded upon the generally recognized
public policy that there must be some end to litigation and that when one appears in court to
present his case, is fully heard, and the contested
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issue is decided against him, he may not ~a~er
renew the litigation in another court. (Citing
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling ~len's Assn., 283
U. S. 522, 525, 526; 75 L. Ed. 1244, 1246, 2147; 51
S. Ct. 517 ...
''This Court has also required that effect be
given in both state and federal courts to a plea
of res adjudicata arising from decrees of a bankrupt court. (Citing cases.)
"And it is well settled that where the trustee
in bankruptcy unsuccessfully litigates an issue
outside the bankruptcy court the decision against
him is binding on the bankruptcy court. (Citing
cases ) ... "
In Re Redwine, D. C. Ala. 1944, 53 Fed. Supp. 249,
55 Am. Bkrpt. Rep. N. S. 459, it is held that ''The doctrine of res adjudicata applies in bankruptcy proceedings."
If one substitutes 'bankrupt' for 'trustee in bankruptcy' in the Heiser v. Woodruff case, supra, it is on
all fours with the ease here in issue, because in the
Heiselt bankruptcy proceedings under Section 75 ( s),
the bankrupt paid out his creditors under his proposal
within the three year stay period ending September 12,
1944, (Ex. 4, P. 5) and there was no necessity for appointing a trustee in bankruptcy. In the cas~ at bar
Heiselt, the farmer debtor bankrupt, went outside the
bankruptcy court into another state (Utah) to litigate
an issue unsuccessfully and in the matter of the petition
filed in bankruptcy on October 28, 1947, (Ex. 2A, Sheets
16 to 21 inc.) on the matter here in issue, the bankruptcy
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court in its decision recognized the principle of res
adjudicata; (Ex. 4) and like,vise in the Petition of the
Debtor to Reopen in 1951, the bankruptcy repeated its
recognition of the principle of res adjudicata. (Ex. A,
P. 3A.)
In the case now before this court, L. H. Heiselt filed
an ans\ver and counter-claim to the complaint of the
plaintiff, A. E. Upton, and in the counter-claim, asked
for affirmative relief in the form of a partnership accounting. (Ex. 3A, Sheets 13 to 16 inc.) It is clear that
Heiselt chose not to assert his adjudication in bankruptcy
but chose rather to proceed with his counter-claim and
affirmative defense. It would be grossly unjust to allo"'"
L·. H. Heiselt \vho failed to ask the court to grant him
relief during the pendency of the action before the District Court on the grounds of his adjudication as a bankrupt because and for the reason that he had a counterclaim against the plaintiff and then when he failed to
prevail in his action on the counter-claim and a judgment
was entered against him, allow him now to set up the
discharge in bankruptcy over two years after the discharge \vas granted.

2-Relief Denied Defendwnt by Colorado Bankruptcy
Cou.rt, And Its Decisions Are Final.
On the 28th day of October, 1947, L. H. Heiselt filed
a petition in the bankruptcy proceeding in the State of
Colorado, requesting the Bankruptcy Court to adjudicate
the matters involved in this Utah case, together with
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other cases pending in Utah and Colorado State Courts,
and for an order staying the proceedings in the State
Courts. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 16 to 21 inc., and Ex. 4, P. 5.)
The Bankruptcy Court denied L. H. Heiselt's. petition
on the 15th day of March, 1948, and in the Ord~r of the
Bankruptcy Court, the Court stated:
''The facts do not warrant the making of any
such adjudication, or the entering of any judgment
in this proceeding. Bankruptcy Courts are not
Trial Courts, and if they were, these controversies
were pending in. other courts. ' ' (Ex. 4, P. 5.)
This ruling in_ effect gave_ consent and authorization
to the Utah. Court to proceed with the adjucation, and
recognized that the jurisdiction of the Utah Court had
attached. This ruling in effect showed that the matter
involved in the Utah Court did not involve matters under
the custody of the Bankruptcy Court.
There was no appeal taken from the Order of the
Bankruptcy Court within the 10 day statutory period.
Thereafter, the Order of the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, was made and the Order
became. final and res adjudicata as to the matters before
the Bankruptcy Court.
L. H. Heiselt was discharged in bankruptcy under
Section 75 (s) on January 14, 1949. (Ex. 2.) On March
6, 1951, L. H. Heiselt filed a petition to reopen the bankruptcy proceedings for the purpose of administering
matters involved in the Utah State Courts and to enjoin
further proceedings by A. E. Upton. (Ex. 3A.) L. H.
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I-Ieiselt died on March 27, 1951, and Annie Ray I-Ieiselt
was appointed administratrix of the deceased's Estate
in the State of Colorado. (Ex. 1.)
On October 19, 1951, the petition which had been
filed by the deceased on March 6, 1951, was called up
before the Judge of the United States District Court at
which time, Frank McGlaughlin was appointed Special
Master to hear and report on the matters involved. (R,.
P. 23, 26, 27, Ex. A.)
The attorneys for the Estate of L. H. Heiselt and
for A. E. Upton, were notified of the hearing to be held
.
on December 10, 1951, before the Special Master in
Denver, Colorado. It '\vas agreed between the parties
that, ''The Special Master should consider the entire
record in the case, together with certified copies of the
Pleadings and Judgments in Utah cases," and the record
of the case no'\v before this court fully considered, as
appears from the report of the Special Master found at
pages 4 and 5 of (Ex. A, Ex. 3A, 4, P. 23, 26, 27).
.

It was argued by the attorneys for the Estate of
L. H. Heiselt, that any state action involving property
of the debtor was void because of claims prohibitions of
the "Stay" features of the Bankruptcy Act. The Special
Master's report came to the follo'\ving conclusion:
CONCLUSION OF FACTS
''It will be seen from the foregoing summary
that the stay order was made after the debtor was
adjudicated a bankrupt under Section 75s on July
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7, 1941, and that that stay order expired ?n September 13, 1944. The Application of Sect~on 75n,
o, and pas a statutory stay of proceedings expired
on July 7 1941 when the debtor was adjudic.ated
' under
' Section 75s, and as will be seen
a bankrupt
hereafter, this statutory stay did not extend beyond July 7, 1941.
"The suit to quiet title was not filed until
practically four years after the expiration of the
stay order of September 12, 1941, and the final
judgment quieting title to the real estate in Salt
Lake City, Utah, was not entered until October,
1949, or eight ( 8) years after the stay order.

THE LAW OF THE CASE
''The effect of stay orders is discussed by Callier On Ba;nkruptcy, 14th Edition, at Paragraph
75.34 at page 216 of Volume 5. I quote from page
216:
'The stay of proceedings or moratorium p~o
vided for in Section 75s(2) is, however, a judicial
stay and not an automatic one. It is the debtor's
responsibility to present his petition or application for a stay to the court and see to it that it is
properly brought to the court's attention. The
moratorium period prescribed in Section 75s (2)
will not begin to run until the entry of the stay
order. As indicated in a previous discussion, the
automatic stay engendered by Sec.tion 75 a-r proceedings expires once the debtor has been adjudicated a bankrupt under Section 75s and has the
opportunity to obtain a further stay. But if he
~eglects to obtain a stay, non-bankruptcy proceedIngs completed before a stay order is granted will
not be invalidated.
'Once the matter is presented to the court and
all the preliminary conditions, previously men28
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tioned, have been complied with, the debtor has
an absolute right to the entry of an order staying
all judicial or official proceedings in any court,
or under the direction of any official, for a period
of three years. * *'
:J(:

Reading from page 218:
'The moratorium or stay period runs for a
term of three years after the entry of the stay
order. This term may neither be lengthened, nor
may it be shortened, except in the manner prescribed in subdivision s. Thus the duration of the
stay is expressly conditioned to the extent provided in subdivision s ( 3) :r.· * *'
''Under Section s ( 3), no stay is contemplated.
I, therefore, conclude as follows:
"That the respondent, Upton, has not violated
any of the provisions of the stay order of September 12, 1941, which. expired September 12-13,
1944, and that the reopening of the case would not
benefit the debtor as a determination of his rights
to the Utah property by tax deed or otherwise was
not involved within the date of the stay order and
·the recommendation to the Judge is that the
application of the debtor to reopen the case should
be denied.'' (Ex. A, P. 9, 10, 11.)
No appeal from the findings of the Special Master
was made to the District Court for the State of Colorado,
within the ten-day period as required by la'v and thereafter William Lee Knous, Judge of the U. S. District
Court, for the District of Colorado, signed an Order
dated April 14, 1952, affirming the report and recommendations of the Special Master. (Ex. B.)
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It is appellant's contention that the judgment of
the Utah Supreme Court is final; that defendant cannot
no'v set up the discharge in bankruptcy after having
failed to notify the court during the Utah proceedings
that he had been adjudicated a bankrupt. And in addition thereto, it is clear that the Colorado Bankruptcy
Court, althougp it had been petitioned twice, once before
the discharge in bankruptcy and once after the discharge
in bankruptcy, to allo'v L. H. Heiselt, the bankrupt debtor
to reopen the bankruptey proeeedings for the purpose of
including this judgment and the obligation on which it
was founded refused to allow the reopening and thereby
implied that L. H. Heiselt, by reason of his failure to
schedule the indebtedness due the plaintiff was stopped
from further procedure before the Bankruptcy Court,
because the Utah Court's jurisdiction had attached. The
Utah Court, thereafter rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, which judgment was affirmed on appeal.
Therefore,. this matter then became res adjudicata.
Justice Harlan in Johnston Steel Street Rail Co. vs.
Wharton, 152 U. S. 252, 38 L. Ed. 429, 432, 14 S. Ct. 608
said:
"The objeet in establishing judieial tribunals
is that controversies bet"~een parties, which may
be the subjeet of litigation, shall be finally determined. The peace and order of society demand
that matters distinetly put in issue and determined
by a cou:t of competent jurisdiction as to parties
and subJect matter, shall not be retried between
the same parties in any subsequent suit in any
court.''
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C. FAILURE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT L.
H. HEISELT TO SCHEDULE DEBT OWING
CREDITOR, IS FATAL TO HIS MOTION TO
STAY EXECUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF
NOTICE OR ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

1-The Debt Was Not Scheduled.
It was found by the trial court that the obligation
upon which the judgment in this case was founded "ra.s
not scheduled. Findings of Fact. (R. P. 70, Ex~ 1A.)
The material part of the Bankruptcy .Act, 11 U. S. C.
A., Section 35 is as follows :
"(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether
allowable in full or in part, except such as * ~: *
(3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof
and allowance, with the name of the creditor, if
known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had
notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in
bankruptcy * * * ''
In ..t:1shbaugh v. Belan.ge1", 39 F. Supp. 401, 404, the
court said:
''To be discharged in bankruptcy from a debt,
a petitioning bankrupt must exercise due and
reasonable diligence to ascertain and properly
schedule his creditors.''
L. H. Heiselt endorsed the note, upon which the
judgment in this case was founded in 1936. It cannot
be said that he exercised "due and reasonable diligenee"
when he failed to schedule his obligation on the note,
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assuming for the discussion of the point, that there was
a provable debt which the plaintiff denies.
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the obligation
upon which the judgment in this case is founded 'vas not
duly scheduled as required by the Statute, that the
respondent cannot now assert the discharge in bankruptcy as a bar to the appellant's recovering on his
judgment.
Not only did he fail to schedule his obligation as
endorser on the note, but he later was given two opportunities by the Bankruptcy Court to inform the Bankruptcy Court of his obligation to A. E. Upton, which he
"\vholly failed to do.
Attention is called to the fact that after reference
of the bankruptcy proceeding to Mr. Frank M. McLaughlin, as referee in bankruptcy, at Denver, Colorado,
from Mr .. Hugh E. Cra\vford, Cancellation Commission
at Alamosa, Colorado. Mr. McLaughlin, on April 26,
1943, issued an order to the bankrupt, part of which is
as follows:
''For the purpose of determining what orders
should be made herein for the protection of the
debtor and the debtor's creditors, the said debtor
is hereby ordered and directed to furnish and file
with the undersigned referee in bankruptcy, action
as Conciliation Commissioner herein, the following information, said information to be filed in
the form of a written report, duly signed and
verified by the debtor, on or before ten days from
and after the date hereof.
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'' (1) Furnish the following information relative to the stock, property and effects of the
Heiselt Construction Company, owned by the
bankrupt and his 'Yife at the time the petition was
filed or acquired subsequent thereto, to-wit:
SubdiYision (d) asked the questions:
'' (d) What, if any, property which belonged
to the Heiselt Construction Company at the time
of the filing of the petition herein, on October 21,
1940, has been sold or encumbered? If any, what
amount was obtained therefor, and what disposition was made of the money? If mortgaged, to
'vhom, and for 'vhat, and what amount, if any, has
been paid? ' ' (Ex. 2A, Sheet 4.)
The report of the debtor, L. H. Heiselt, in answer to
the above mentioned order 'vas filed May 5, 1943. (Ex.
2A, Sheets 7 to 15 inc.) A comparison of that report with
the complaint, answers and cross-complaint filed in this
action before the lo,ver court and the later petition of
L. H. Heiselt on October 28, 1947, in bankruptcy (Ex.
2A, Sheets 16 to 21), sho,vs that the debtor L. H. Heiselt
did not fully and truthfully set forth the information
requested in the order in that he did not state the amount
of the mortgage, nor did he set out the mortgage, nor
did he state to that court that he was an endorser of the
note tvhich secured the r;nortgage. He, at that time, had
full opportunity to bring before the Bankruptcy Court
the obligation on which the judgment in this case is
founded. This he utterly failed to do.
Going next to the petition of October 28, 1947, (Ex.
2A, Sheet 16) of the Bankruptcy Court by Mr. Mci.Jaugh-
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lin, (Ex. 4) attention is ealled to the fact that the debtor
therein brought up the very same allegations that he
included in his cross-complaint, in the case now before
this court. The pleadings in this case are set out in full
in Exhibit 3A commencing at sheet 9.
The mortgage involved in this case is mentioned in
Paragraph 12 of the October 28, 1947 petition. Paragraph 13 of the petition sets forth the note. Particular
attention is called to the fact that the debtor Haiselt
omited to allege or set forth in the petition for the information of the Bankruptcy Court, that L. H. Heiselt
personally endorsed and guaranteed the note upon which
plaintiff's judgment is founded. (Ex. 2A, P. 16 to 21
inc.) See. also (R. P. 50, 51).
It is, therefore, readily apparent that the debtor
Heiselt not only purposely and deliberately failed to
schedule the debt upon 'vhich the judgment in this case
is based, but on the two occasions mentioned immediately
above, the debtor Heiselt intentionally, purposely and
deliberately omitted including the information after
having been ordered to do so by the Bankruptcy Court
and at a later date, after suit had been commenced in
this case, failed to include the information in his petition of October 28, 1947.
It cannot be logically contended by the defendant
that L. H. Heiselt just overlooked this obligation in vie'v
of the fact that the complaint in the case before this court
was filed in 1943, and in that complaint, he was personally
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charged as a defendant because of his endorsement of
the said note which secured the mortgage and upon
which endorsement the judgment involved in this case
was entered against him personally.
It is submitted that L. H. Heiselt failed to exercise
"due and reasonable diligence to ascertain and properly
schedule his creditors,'' Ashbaugh v. Belanger, supra.
''The burden of proving that he did all things
required of him under the bankruptcy law· to give
notice to the respondant creditor of the bankruptcy proceedings or that the latter had actual
knowledge of them rests upon the plaintiff in this
case. Wylie v. Masinopky, 201 Mass. 583, 88 N.E.
448; Wineman v. Fisher, 135 Mich. 604, 608, 98
N.W. 404.''
Parker vs. Murphy, 215 Mass. 72, 102 N.E. 85,
87.

2-A. E. Upton Did Not Recei1)e Notice or .flctual Kn.o~ol
edge of the Proceedings in. Bankruptcy in Time to
Allo~v Him to Present His Cla.im.
(a) He Did Not Receive a Notice From the Court.

At the outset, it should be noted that the btttrden of
proving discharge in ba;nkruptcy is on the one who seeks
to show that an obligation was dishonored in bankruptcy.
The burden is not on one seeking to enforce the payment
of an obligation to prove that his obligation was not
discharged.
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The rule is stated in
809 as follows:

6 . .-1m. J·u r.,

( Ba'llkruptcy), Par.

"The authorities are uniform that where a
discharge in bankruptcy is pleaded as a defense
to an action, and the plea is traversed, the burden
is upon the defendant ultimately to prove his discharge. What may appear to be a conflict in the
cases on the burden of proof of a discharge in
bankruptcy asserted as a defense to an action
against the bankrupt is explained by the failure
to differentiate between the burden of proof in
the ultimate sense and in the sense of going forward with the evidence at a particular stage in
the case.''

Kobebell v. Diers Bros. & Co., 87 Colo. 67, 71; 285 P.
165, 167.
''When the defendant interposed the defense
of a discharge in bankruptcy to defeat the judgment of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff offered and
proved that its claim was not properly scheduled,
and for that reason did not receive the notice contemplated by law, the burden was upon the defendant who claimed the benefit of the discharge
in bankruptcy to prove that the plaintiff had
notice or actual kno,vledge of the bankruptcy proceedings, and, upon the failure of the defendant
so to do, the discharge was not a bar to the ju~g
ment.''
It is, therefore, apparent that respondent has the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that appellant A. E. Upton actually had notice of the
bankruptcy proceedings as required by Section 35 of the
Bankruptcy Act supra.
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In order for a bankrupt debtor to avoid the penalty
which comes from not properly scheduling a debt, he
must show (1) that the creditor actually received a notice
from the Bankruptcy Court or (2) that the creditor had
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. The
trial court found as follows :
"That shortly after the 16th day of November,
1940, and before the first day of January, 1941,
the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, received notice and
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings
filed by the defendant, L. H. Heiselt; that the
plaintiff, A. E. Upton, was represented by counsel,
Raphael J. Moses, at the first meeting of creditors
held on April 29, 1941; that the plaintiff, A. E.
Upton, again received notice and actual knowledge
of said bankruptcy proceedings in May and June
of 1941; that he received notice and actual knowledge of the said bankruptcy proceedings in ample
time to avail himself of the benefits of the bankruptcy law and in ample time to give him an equal
opportunity with other creditors. (R. P. 71.)
Plaintiff assigns as error this finding of the trial
court on the grounds that it is contrary to the evidence,
as there is no evidence to support the said finding.
In the schedule of debts filed by the bankrupt debtor
there appears $30.00 personal debt owing to A. E. Upton.
(Ex. lA, P. 4). It was claimed by the defendant in the
lower court, that because that debt was listed on the
schedule by L. H. Heiselt, the bankrupt debtor, that A. E.
Upton, the plaintiff herein, necessarily received notice
from the court. There was no proof presented by de37
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fendant that a notice was sent to A. E. Upton. The
alleged $30.00 debt was not scheduled properly.
In regards to the requirement of sending out notices
to creditors, the Bankruptcy Act provides:
Sec. 75 (e), 11 U .S.C.A. Sec. 203 (e).
''The conciliation commissioner shall promptly
call the first meeting of creditors, stating in the
notice that the farmer proposes to offer terms of
composition or extension, and inclosing with the
notice a summary of the inventory, a brief statement of the farmer's indebtedness as shown by
the schedules, and a list of the na.mes and addresses of the secured and unsecured creditors,
with the amounts owing to each as shown by the
schedules . . . '' (Italics ours.)
Rafael J. Moses, a witness for the respondent was
asked questions on direct examination concerning the
$30.00 claim of A. E. U ptoD:. He testified as follows on
pages 4 and 5 of his deposition: (Ex. 5A.)
Q. Also in connection with your office files, I
think there is some notation regarding this $30.00
claim of A. E. Upton, is that true~

A. Yes, attached to the notice of first meeting
of creditors which we received on November 21st,
there is a t'vo-page statement entitled ''Inventory
and List of Creditors''. In my handwriting, at
the bottom of the list under item National City
Bank, Denver, Colorado, liability by reason of
endorsement of note of L. H. Heiselt, Inc.,
$11,000.00, I have written-''E. B. Upton, Alter &
Upton, 710 Majestic Building, $30.00. '' And in
the corner along the side of that notation are the
initials "A. E."
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Q. Do you recall the occasion for that notation or the reason for

it~

A. It was made either one or two times. It
was made either at the time of the conference in
Denver or at the time of the first meeting of
creditors, and I am inclined to believe it was the
latter occasion because the same list of Inventory
and List of Creditors has comments written as to
each one, as to whether it was allowed and if, how
much was allowed and I believe from that, that
this came out in the first hearing; that this was
one of the claims which ~lr. Heiselt was listing,
but for some rea.son had not been copied on the
first list which was attached to the notice of first
meeting of creditors. I believe it was listed in his
Schedules which were filed with the Petition in
Bankruptcy.
This clearly indicates that the $30.00 item must not
have been on the schedule originally, otherwise it would
have been on the list attached to the notice of the first
meeting of creditors and furthermore, this proves conclusively that no notice of the first meeting of creditors
was mailed to A. E. Upton, for the reason that notice
would go only to those creditors whose names appeared
on the list.
The photostat copy of the schedule of debts in bankrupt (Ex. 1A, P. 4) shows that the typing in of the $30.00
debt is different from the other typing. It no doubt was
done at a later time. This lends weight to the testimony
of Rafael J. Moses above cited that the $30.00 item was
not on the list attached to the notice at the time the
notice of the first meeting of creditors dated Nov. 16,
1940 for the meeting to be held December 21, 1940.
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This fully corroborates the testimony of A. E. Upton
that he did not receive notice from the court, particularly
the notice issued out of the court on November 16, 1940,
which the trial court in its findings specifically found
that he had received. As to the subsequent notices of
First :Nleeting of Creditors of March 8 and 17, 1941, the
record shows that A. E. Upton was away from his residence in Denver, Colorado and 'vould not have received
notice from the court, if they were ever sent with respect
to the $30.00 item, because his residence address was not
set forth in the schedules as is more fully discussed
hereafter.
It is required that the correct address of the creditor
be set out in the schedule. 6 Am. Jur., (Bankruptcy),
Par. 381 sets out the rule as follows:
''The reason for requiring an accurate statement of the names of creditors applies with the
same, if not greater, force to the statement of
their residences. Notices sent by mail may not
reach the creditors for ,~lhom they are intended, if
their correct addresses are not given. The Bankruptcy Act requires that the schedule, if known,
and if unknown, that such fact be stated. The
omission of the known address of a creditor renders the schedule insufficient and the debt is not
discharged, unless the creditor had knowledge of
the proceedings in time to participate with other
creditors.
'' * * It is also well settled that a debt is not
duly scheduled if the bankrupt has listed the
creditor's address incorrectly, at least not where
the correct address can be ascertained. The ad=r.<
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dress of a club at which the creditor does not
reside is not a sufficient address.
''The requirement for duly scheduling the
names and residences of creditors is a most important one.''

Parker us. Murphy, 215 1\'lass. 72, 102 N. E. 85, 87.
See also Van. Dinburgh vs. Goodfellow, et al., 1901 2d
217, 120 P. 2d 20, 23; llfarlenee vs. Warkentin, 17 Calif.
App. 177, 162 P. 2d 321, 327, also Bucci vs. La Rocca, 33
A. 2d 878, 881 (infra p. 55).
In the case of Marlowe v. Patt, 1950, 96 N. Y. Supp.
2d 725, 726, the court held :
''The schedules filed in bankruptcy proceedings listed the judgments and judgment creditors,
but neither as originally filed nor as later amended
did they state the residence address of either
creditor, nor the fact that such was unknown, as
required by Act. 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 25 (8). A strict
compliance with that requirement has been held
essential to the debt's discharge. Horback v. Arkell, 172 App. Div. 566, 158 N.Y.S. 842 ... "
The residence address of A. E. Upton was known
very well to L. H. Heisel t. They had been personally
acquainted over a long period of time.
The deposition of A. E. Upton was taken in Denver,
Colorado. (Ex. 4A, P. 3, 4.) The following questions
and answers were given:
Q. I call your attention back to the year of
1940 and '41, where was your legal residence at
that time~
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A·. 301 South 'Villiams Street, Denver, Colorado.
Q. Are you acquainted and were you acquainted with L. H. Heiselt during his lifetimeY

A. Yes.
Q. And he is also known as Lawrence Hensen
Heiselt ~

A. Yes.
Q. When was your first acquaintance with
Mr. Heiselt; when did you first become acquainted
with him~ Approximately.

A. Well, I would say approximately 1912.

Q. And you knew him and were acquainted
with him prior to and after and during the years
1940 and '41 ~
A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether or not L. H. Heiselt
was acquainted with your residence in Denver in
1940 and '41 of 301 South Williams Street, Denver,
Coloradof
A. Yes.
Q. Had he ever been at that house prior to
1940~

· A. Yes. He and his wife were there with me
for a "\veek in 1941, I think· it was.

Q. But he was out there before 1940, was he~
A. Yes.
It is apparent that A. E. Upton's residence address
was known to L. H. Heiselt or should have been known
or easily learned. The address given was c/o the Na42
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tional City Bank, Denver, Colorado. Claims are not
properly scheduled if the residence address is not given
when the residence address of the creditor ought to have
been known by the debtor or could easily have been
determined. Pa.rker v. Murphy, supra; Kreatlein v. Ferger, 238 U. S. 21, 37.
In view of the fact that A. E. Upton was in California during the period of time the notice might have
been sent out, it is highly improbable that the notice
ever came to his attention. (Ex. 4A, 7, 8.) The receiving
of the notice is denied by A. E. Upton. (Ex. 4A, P. 4,
5, 6.)
A. E. Upton testified on direct examination that he
did not receive notice of the l\{eeting of Creditors held
in . AJamosa :
Q. During the years of 1940 and 1941, did you
receive any notice of a Meeting of Creditors before
the Conciliatory Commissioner of Bankruptcy in
Alamosa in the matter of bankruptcy proceedings
of I.~. H. Heiselt before mentioned 1
.A.. Not to my knowledge ..

From the evidence produced, it cannot be said that
the defendant has sustained the burden of proving that
A. E. Upton received notice from the Bankruptcy Court.
(b) He Did. Not Authorize Rafael J. Moses to Represent

Him at the Creditors Meeting.
It was claimed by the defendant in the court below
that Rafael J. Moses, an attorney of Alamosa, Colorado,
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entered an appearance for A. E. Upton at the first meeting of the creditors of L. H. Heiselt held at Alamosa,
Colorado, on lVIarch 29, 1941, pursuant to the notices of
March 8, 1941, and March 17, 1941. (Ex. D, Sheet 6) .
. A_. E. Upton denies that he ever received a notice.
The deposition of Rafael J. Moses was taken at
Alamosa, Colorado. At page 3 of the deposition starting
a little below the center of the page J\1:oses testified as
follows in regard to questions propounded about the
Creditors Meeting a.t Alamosa and the appearance
entered:
''I ha.ve no i.ndependent recollection of entering the appea.rance of the National City Barnk or
A. E. Upton a.t the first meeting of creditors held
on March 29, 1941; that our office records do show
that on November 22, 1940, which would be two
days after receipt of these notices, I made a. trip
to Denver in connection with this matter, but I do
recall having a meeting in the office of Alter and
Upton with Mr. Ernest B. Upton. Our records
show no payment of any fee by A. E. Upton or
the National City Bank, and so far as the authority
for entering the appearance of the National City
Bank and A. E. Upton, I have no direct recollection." (Ex. 5A, P. 5, 6.) (Italics ours.)

Mr. Moses had previously testified that he had destroyed his correspondence file :
Q. Were you ever personally authorized by

Mr. A. E. Upton to represent him in the Bank~
ruptcy Proceedings of L. H. Heiselt of Alamosa
in the years 1940 or 1941 ~
'
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A. I have no recollection of such authority. It
is possible that in the correspondence file that was
destroyed that such an authorization appeared,
but I have no recollection of it at all. Remember
this was fourteen years ago and my only contact
was the conference in Denver, at the office of
Alter & Upton. (Ex. 5A, P. 5, 6.)
At page 4 of his deposition, Mr. Moses testified that
the expense of the trip he took to Denver was charged
to his client, the Union Central Life Insurance Company,
which Company had a claim of $20,000.00 against the
bankrupt, L. H. Heisel t.
Although Mr. Moses testified that the trip was made
for the purpose of seeing Mr. Ernest B. Upton, the
lawyer brother of A. E. Upton, it would appear in view
of the fact that the expense of the trip was charged to
the Union Central Life Insurance Company, his client,
that the trip to Denver must have been on behalf of the
Union Central Life Insurance Company to justify charging that company for the expense of the trip.
During the cross-examination of Rafael J. Moses as
to who authorized him to appear for A. E. Upton, the
following questions were propounded and answered :
(Deposition of Rafael J. Moses, Ex. 5A, P. 8.)
Q. But you do state that A. E. Upton never
personally authorized you and if you had any it
was through Ernest~

A. That is my belief.
The Ernest referred to above 1s Ernest Upton, a
brother of A. E. Upton, whose deposition was also taken.
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Further inquiring into the alleged authorization received by Rafael J. Moses, he was asked the following
questions concerning the destroyed correspondence file,
and he gave the following answers on redirect examination:
Q. ~fr. Roberts: Do you have any recollection

of the contents of the correspondence file'
A. No, sir.
Q. And my understanding of your testimony
is that you base your appearance for A. E. Upton
on the contents of that file~

A. It is possible, I have no recollection, but
it is possible. It might have been.
Q. Do you have any recollection of any cor·

respondence in this

file~

A. Oh, I know it contained voluminous corres·
pondence with Union Central Life Insurance Company.
Q. And A. E. Upton or Alter & Upton?

A. I couldn't say.
Q. That is all.

Rafael J. Moses, also testified that he had never met
A. E. Upton. He gave the following answers to questions
propounded:
Q. Mr. Moses, I want to be sure you dis-

tinguish between A. E. Upton and Ernest B.
Upton. Now, Ernest B. is the attorney-at-law,
and A. E. Upton is a brother, but a separate
person.
A. Yes.
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Q. Now, have you ever met Mr. A. E. Upton 1

A. I don't believe so. I don't recall his being
present at the meeting in Denver.
Q. You don't ever remember having met him 1

A. No, I have no recollection of meeting him.
Q. Were you ever personally authorized by
~fr.

A. E. Upton to represent him in the bankruptcy proceeding of L. H. Heiselt in Alamosa, in
the years of 1940 or 19411
A. I have no recollection of any such author-·
ity. It is possible that in this correspondence file
that was destroyed that such an authorization
appeared, but I have no recollection of it at all.
Remember this was fourteen years ago and my
only contact was this conference in Denver at the
office of Alter & Upton.
It is submitted that Rafael J. Moses, having no independent recollection of the matter and having destroyed
his correspondence files in which he says there might
have been some authorization, did not testify with that
degree of certainty necessary to convince one that he did
have authority to enter the appearance of A. E. Upton.
We must now consider the testimony of A. E. Upton
and Attorney Ernest B. Upton on the question as to
whether or not Rafael Moses was ever authorized to
represent A. E. Upton at the Creditors' Meeting. A. E.
Upton testified as follows: (Ex. 4A, P. 6, 7.)
Q. Are you acquainted with one Raphael J.

Moses, an attorney at law, whose office is in
Alamosa, Colorado 1
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A. Is that Senior or Junior?
Q. Raphael J. Moses, his son, or a Moses who

was an attorney in

Alamosa~

·

A. No, I have no recollection of ever having
met him.
Q. I don't recall the first name of Judge Moses
but Raphael J. Moses is the son of former Judge
Moses of Alamosa.

Did you ever authorize Raphael J. Moses to
represent you in bankruptcy proceedings instituted by L. H. Heiselt in the Bankruptcy Court of
the District Court of the United States for the
State of Colorado during the years 1940 or 1941 ~
A. No, nor any other years.
Q. He never represented

you~

A. No.
Q. Have you ever spoken to Raphael J. Moses~

A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Do you know

him~

A. I don't know him to my knowledge ; I don't
think I have ever seen the gentleman.
Attorney Ernest Upton testified on deposition a.t the
instance of defendant hereon. On direct examination, he
testified as follo,vs: (Ex. 6A, P. 9, 10, 11.)
Q. Do you know Raphael Moses~

A. I would know him if I should see him, I
assume. I know that I've seen him once and he
'
says he saw me once here in Denver.

Q. Do you recall seeing him here in Denver~
48
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A. No, I don't recall anything about that. I
knew his father, Albert ~loses, between 1909 and
1913. I met him here in Denver in the office where
I was located at the time but I hadn't seen him
for many years and after this hearing in bankruptcy there I went around to the office to see him
and he wasn't there but Raphael was there, and
that's the only time I actually remember of seeing
him.
Q. I notice that in the proceedings of the
bankruptcy of Lawrence Hensen Heiselt it appears that Mr. Raphael J. Moses appeared in
behalf of the N a.tional City Bank at that first
meeting of creditors; did you have any communication with Mr. Moses in connection with that
appearance~

A. Not that I remember.
Q. I notice that he also appeared for ~fr. A. E.
Upton, did you have any-do you recall any communication you made with Mr. Moses concerning
that~

A. I don't recall any.
Q. Did you take any steps to have the bank
represented at the first meeting of the creditors~

A. No, I didn't.
Q. Did you discuss with anyone at the bank
having anybody make an appearance~

A. I don't recall that. I can't tell you all
those details, Mr. Roberts.
Q. Would you say that you did not communicate with anyone in Alamosa for the purpose of
having representation during that time~

A. Yes, I would say that I never had any communication with anybody. If you are talking about
49
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

representation of A. E., I never-I had nothing
to do "\vith it as far a.s he 'vas concerned. I was
only interested in the bank angle.
Q. Other than the fact you did inform him
'vhen you got the list of creditors that his name
was on the list~

A. I informed the bank and gave them a list.
Q. You informed Mr. Upton that he was on
there for $30 f

A. I probably did, but whether I did or not I
won't say because I don't remember and I never
represented him in the matter of filing any claims.
Q. Do you have any idea how it is that Mr.
Moses appeared in behalf of either the bank or
Mr. Upton u?

A. I haven't the slightest idea, Mr. Roberts,
how it happened.
Q. Have you made any search of the bank
records to determine whether or not authority
'vas given~

A. No, I haven't.
Q. Ordinarily, would the bank records reflect
that fact~

A. No reason for it.
l\tiR. ROBERTS : That's all.

Certainly the defendant did not sho"r by the testimony of the "!itnesses in this case, that A. E. Upton or
that anyone authorized by A. E. Upton, gave authority
to Rafael J. Moses to enter an appearance for him a.t the
Meeting of Creditors held in Alamosa, Colorado, on
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March 29, 1941, or at any other time. Unless the defendant sustained the burden of proof in respect to this
point, it cannot be said that A. E. Upton received notice
of the proceedings in bankruptcy by reason of the alleged
entry of appearance claimed to have been made by
Rafael Moses.
(c) A. E. Upton Did Not Receive Actual Knowledge of

the Bankruptcy Proceedings_ From Any Source in
T~me in Which to Perfect His Claim.
It has been shown that A. E. Upton did not receive
a notice from the Bankruptcy Court, and that he should
not be charged with the appearance of Rafael J. Moses
at the meeting of c~editors for the reason that such appearance was unauthorized, and that the entry of appearance was no doubt a clerical error. There is no positive
evidence that A. E. Upton had "actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceedings'' in time within which to file his
claim assuming it was a provable debt.
We must next ask the question, how much time did
A. E. Upton have within which to obtain "notice or
.actual knowledge'' of the bankruptcy proceedings and
file his claim 1 The statute is clear.
Sec. 57 ( n) of the Barnkruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A.,
Par. 93 (n) :
'' . . Claims which are not filed within six
months after the first date set for the first meeting
of creditors shall not be allowed ... ''
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The court in Re Dunn, D. C. Wash. 1941, 38 Fed.
Supp. 1017, 1018, 47 Am,. Bankr. Rep. N. S. 186, in discussing the effect of the statute said:
''Under the Chandler Act, however, it is clear
that the Court has no authority to allow any
claims which are not filed within six months after
the date set for the first meeting of creditors.
"In the recent opinion of United States District Judge Caillouet in Re Quine, D. C., 38 F.
Supp. 869, filed Jan. 27, 1941, it is said:
'The present petitioner is barred by Section
57 (n) of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended (11
U.S.C.A. Sec. 93 sub. n), from now filing and pre~
senting his alleged claim, granting that his petition otherwise makes out a case, in the discretion
of the Court, for the re-opening of the bankruptcy
proceedings.
'The statute specifying the time for filing
claims in bankruptcy is prohibitive, and gives the
Court no discretionary power to extend the
time.' ''
In Re Quine, D. C. La. 1941, 38 Fed. Supp. 869, 870,
the court said :
''Even though a creditor had no notice or
knowledge of the proceedings during the time
allowed by law for the proving of claims, and the
estate is still undistributed, he may not prove his
debt after the lapse of such period. In Re Muskoka
Lumber Company, D. C. W. D. New York 1904,
127 Fed. 886. ''
In Re W a.gner, D. C. Minn., 1946, 64 Fed. Supp. 481,
483, the court said :
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'' The proceedings under Section 75, and the
Court's jurisdiction over them, are commenced
by the filing of the original petition provided for
in Subsection c and n. 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 203, subs.
c. n; Kolb v. Fuerstein 1938, 308 U. S. 433, 60 S.
Ct. 343; 84 L. Ed. 370 ... "
The farmer-debtor, L. H. Heiselt, filed his original
petition in bankruptcy under Section 75 on October 21,
1940. (Ex. 4, P. 2.) On November 16, 1940, there was
issued the 'Notice of First Meeting of Creditors' setting
the first date of the first meeting of creditors as December 21, 1940. (Ex. D, Sheet 4.) Therefore, June 21, 1941,
was the date of the six months limitation mentioned in
Section 57 (n) of the Bankruptcy Act in which creditors
might have filed and proven their claims in t~e L. H.
Heiselt proceeding.
The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A., Sec. 35 supra requires that the bankrupt who seeks to show that a debt
has been discharged even though it had not been scheduled, must do so by proving that the creditor ''had notice
or actual knowledge'' of the bankruptcy proceedings.
On the point as to the nature of the ''notice or actual
knowiedge'' required to be had by a creditor the New
York court said in Wheeler vs. Newton., (1915) 154 N. Y.
S. 431, 168 App. Div. 782, affirmed 220 N. Y. 607, 115
N. E. 1053:
'' ... While it is true that the 'vord ''actual''
does not usually advance the meaning, it must be
understood in the connection used in the statute
under consideration to emphasize the fact that
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kno,vledge of the party must be actual as c_ontradistinguished from construcf'ive or speculat~ve. It
must be something existing in fact. 1 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, 601. The statute requires that the
plaintiff should have 'had notice or actual knowledge', and the rule is well-established that where
a statute requires notice to be given, and there is
nothing in the context of the statute, or in the circumstances of the case, to show that any other
notice~as intended, a personal notice must always
be given. Beakes v. Da Cunha, 126 N.Y. 293, 297;
27 N. E. 251. It must follow, therefore, that when
the statute here under consideration required
'notice or actual knowledge,' it contemplated a
personal notice, or' knowledge of the proceedings
in Bankruptcy' equivalent to such personal notice.
In other words, that great underlying principle
of our law, that no one shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law, is present
in this statute, and it requires such personal
notice of the proceedings, or actual kno,vledge
equivalent to such personal notice, as would be
required in any court where it was proposed to
deprive a man of his property.
''The proof and the findings here go no further than to sho'v that the plaintiff was told by a
stranger to the proceeding that the defendant
Newton had gone into bankruptcy. But the fact
that one's debtor has gone into bankruptcy is not
notice or knowledge of 'the proceedings in Bankruptcy'. It does not impose the duty upon the
creditor to taking active steps. He has a right to
rely upon the provisions of the statute that he
shall ha,ve notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings; he has a right _to assume ·that no substantial right will be taken from him without his
~a.ving an_opportunity for contesting the question
1n the ordinary way-that the bankrupt will com54
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ply with the conditions of the statute necessary
for his own relief. In Morrison v. Vaughan, 119
App. Div. 184; 104 N. Y. Supp. 169, the plaintiff
had notice of the bankruptcy through reading of
it in ne,vspapers, and subsequently the defendant
and his clerk verbally conveyed the information
to the plaintiff, while yet there was time to intervene in the proceeding, and the First Department
(~Ir. Justice Laughlin dissenting) held that the
plaintiff had such actual knowledge as to come
'vithin the provisions of the statute. This is clearly
carrying the rule to -its limit, and does not justify
this court in holding that a mere casual conversation with a disinterested person, in which the
plaintiff is told that the defendant has gone into
bankruptcy, is such 'notice or-actual knowledge of
the proceedings in bankruptcy' as to entitle the
defendant to be discharged of the obligation of an
unscheduled and provable debt.'' (Italics ours.)
In Bucci v. LaRocca, New Jersey (1943), 33 A. 2d
878, 882, 21 N. J. Misc. 316, 55 Am. Bkr. Rep. N. S. 1,
the court said :
''After proof of lack of due scheduling has
been met, the burden is upon the bankrupt to show
actual knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy on
the creditor's part. Remington on Bankruptcy,
Volume 7, 5th Edition, Articles 3578, 843; Hill v.
Smith, Supreme Court 1923, 260 U. S. 592, 43 S.
Ct. 219, 67 L. Ed. 419; 8 C.J.S. Bankruptcy, Sec.
586 subsec. b, p. 1585. And further enunciated in
Birkett v. Columbia Bank, Supreme Court, 1904,
195 U. S. 345, 25 S. Ct. 38, 40 ; 49 L. Ed. 231,
wherein the matter of time of actual knowledge
was under review. This pertinent comment was
made: 'Actual knowledge of the proceedings,
contemplated by the section, is a knowledge in
time to avail a creditor of the benefits of the law,
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-in time to give him an equal opportunity with
other creditors, -not a knowledge that m~y come
so late as to deprive him of a participation in the
administration of the affairs of the estate, or to
deprive him of dividends (Sec. 65). The provisions of the law relied upon by plaintiff in error
are for the benefit of the creditors, not of the
debtor. That the law should give a creditor remedies against the estate of a bankrupt, not withstanding the neglect of the bankrupt, is natural.
The law would be, indeed, defective without them.
It would also be defective if it permitted the bankrupt to experiment with it, -to so manage and
use its provisions as to conceal his estate, deceive
or keep his creditors in ignorance of his proceedings, without penalty to him. It is easy to see
what results such looseness would permit, -what
preference could be accomplished and covered
by it."
"Also refer to Feld Lumber Co. v. Bornstien,
Supreme Court, 1937, 118 N. J. L. 357 at page ~58,
192 A. 738. ''
We must inquire as to what opportunity A. E. Upton
had to learn of the bankruptcy proceedings. He testified
that he was in Palo ·Alto, California, from the first part
of January to the last part of May, 1941. Certainly he
would not have the opportunity to learn of the bankruptcy
proceedings while in California. In any event, there is
no evidence that A. E. Upton learned of the bankruptcy
while he was away from Denver. The fact that he was
away is not in dispute.
Q. I call your attention to the period of time
beginning the first part of the year 1941, in J anuary, and up to and until about the 1st of June or
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the 28th of May, 1941, do you recall where you
were~

A. I do.
Q. Where were

you~

A. In Palo Alto, California.
Q. When did you leave Denver to go to Palo

Alto-about?
A. I would say about in the month of January.
Q. What

year~

A. 1941.
Q. And you stayed in Palo Alto until when 1

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I
remained there until just in time to get back here
by the 1st of May.
Q. May?

A. Yes -wait a minute -no, no; I just can't
give the date; I know that I was in Denver the
28th of May. I have definite knowledge of that by
reason of having issued a check here to send out
there for $225. to my wife.
Q. And you left in January of 1941 and returned sometime the latter part of May, 1941'

A. Yes. (Ex. 4A, P. 7, 8.)
A. E. Upton testified that he first became aware that
L. H. Heiselt had filed bankruptcy proceedings after the
year 1941. (Ex. 4A, P. 7, 8.) The defendant, in order to
prevail, must prove by the evidence that A. E. Upton
gained "actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy'' between the time he returned to Denver in the
latter part of May, 1941, and .June 21, 1941. The burden
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of p1•o.of is on the defendant and is not on A. E.· Upton
to disprove notice. On cross-examination by Mr. Roberts,
attorney for defendant, A. E. Upton testified a~ follows:
Q. Now, in 1940 and '41 Mr. Heiselt was obligated to National City Bank in the sum of, oh,
in round figures, $12,500 ~

A. Yes.
Q. You talked with him about the payment

of that, did you

not~

A. Yes.
Q. And he was delinquent on the payments

that he agreed to make on that loan?
A. Yes.
Q. And you talked with him up until the time

you say you left for Palo Alto in January of '41 T
A. Yes.
Q. He talked to you about the fact that he
figured he would have to take out bankruptcy,
didn't he~

A. I don't think anything of the kind was
discussed at that time-not to my recollection.
Q. And did you go down to Alamosa in connection with this matter~

A. This particular matter?
Q. Yes.

A. No.
Q. Were you down in Alamosa in 1940 to see
Mr. Heiselt ~

A. I can't- I can't answer that. I might have
been there and I might not; I just don't know.
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Q. When you left here to go to Palo Alto you

turned over these affairs that you were handling
in the bank to someone, didn't you, to take care of 1
A. Yes. My brother \vas vice president of the
bank and attorney for the bank, and whenever I
wasn't here he looked after those things.
Q. And any personal matters you also per-

mitted him to handle, did you

not~

A. No. I had no occasion to.
Q. Did he ever handle any personal legal

matters for

you~

A. Between Mr. Heiselt and me 1
Q. No.

Any~

A. Well, I can't answer that because I can't
recall any that I had that it would be necessary
to do that at that time.
Q. Was he your personal attorney during that

period of time, 1940 and '411

A. Well, in a sense he has been my principal
attorney ever since he has been practicing law in
Denver.

Q. And it was agreeable with you that he
handle any of your personal matters that came
up, for instance, while you were gone to Palo Alto~
A. He wouldn't handle any of my personal
matters without first communicating with me.
Q. Well, would it be agreeable with you that

he do

it~

A. How is

that~

Q. Would it be agreeable with you that he
do it 1 As they came up.
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A. I can't answer that because it would depend entirely upon what the matter was.
Q. Now, did you learn of the fact that the
bank had to present a claim to the bankruptcy
court.

A. Yes.
Q. And that matter was discussed with you!

A. No.
1.t .

Q. Just a minute. Before it was :filed, wasn't

OJ

A. No. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Could it have

been~

A. Well- yes; I would say, yes, it could have
been but I wasn't here at that time.
Q. You say you came back sometime in May!

A. Sometime in May.
Q. Of 1941 ~

A. Yes.
Q. When you came back.you, of course, again

talked over the things you had been handling for
the bank before you left~
A. There was nothing to talk over in the
matter of the Heiselt case because that was settled
while I was gone. It was filed in bankruptcy court,
as I recall.
Q. And you learned about that when you got

back~

A. Yes.
Q. And who discussed with you that fact, do

you

recall~
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A. Well, if there was any discussion about it,
I would say it would be E. B. Upton.

Q. So, one of the things you learned about
was the fact that this claim had been presented
on behalf of the National City Bank in Mr. Heiselt 's bankruptcy matter 1
A. N o,v, I don't know just what the proceedings were. All I kno"\\7 about that is, my brother
and the cashier of the bank-my brother was vice
president, understand-he and the cashier of the
bank went down to Alamosa in connection with
that matter. Just what they did, I don't know;
I couldn't tell you.

Q. But when you returned here from Palo
Alto they discussed that matter with you and
told you about it 1
A. There was no discussion about it; there
was no occasion for discussion.

Q. Well, they told you about

it~

A. They told me what they had done.

Q. That they had gone down to Alamosa to
check into this bankruptcy rna tter of Mr. Heiselt 's
and to present this claim 1
A. Yes.
Q. And they told you that immediately upon
your return 1

A. No, I wouldn't say immediately. They may
have told me the first day I was here and they
may not have told me for a month.

Q. But it would be within a month after your
return 1
A. Not necessarily. It would be if the occasion arose for the matter to be brought up.
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Defendant did not show by the testimony of A. E.
Upton that he had'' actual knowledge of the proceedings
in bankruptcy" prior to June 21, 1941. The fact that
knowledge was gained after 1941, does not relieve the
defendant of the penalty imposed by the failure of L. H.
Heiselt to properly schedule his obligation to A. E. Upton.
Ernest B. Upton, the lawyer brother of the plaintiff,
A. E. Upton, testified by deposition on behalf of the
defendant on direct 'examination as follows in answer to
the question as to whether or not he, Ernest B. Upton,
was ever consulted with by his brother, A. E. Upton,
concerning the personal obliga.tions owing the .latter by
L. H. Heiselt:
Q. Particula.rly relating to the time during

1940 and '41 were you consulted by your brother
concerning obliga.tions owed to the bank, the
National City Bank, by Heiselt Construction Company or L. H. Heiselt ~
A. Yes.
Q. And were you ever consulted by him in

connection 'vith any personal obligations which
they owed to him personally rather than to the
bank~

A. No. Let me add here: I was an officer,
sto.ckholder and officer, in the National City Bank
also, so I was as much interested as anyone else
in the bank, understand. (Ex. 6A, P. 3.)
Ernest B. Upton, at no time during the taking of his
deposition, gave testimony to the effect that A. E. Upton
had" actu.al knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy"
before Jun.e 21, 1941. Again we must emphasize that the
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burden of proof is on the defendant to show that plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy
prior to June 21, 1941, if defendant is to successfully
raise the bar of the discharge in bankruptcy to defeat
the plaintiff from recovering on the judgment in this
case. Counsel for the defendant interrogated Ernest B.
Upton, defendant's own 'vitness, relative to when A. E.
Upton first gained kno,vledge of the proceedings. Ernest
B. Upton testified that he did tell A. E. Upton that he
saw the $30.00 debt listed on the schedule, but at no time
did he testify as to any dates when he discussed the
matter with him nor did he place the date before June
21, 1941. This is fatal to the claim of the defendant that
A. E. Upton knew of the proceedings. "Actual knowledge
of the proceedings in bankrtttptcy'' does not mean information gained from a casual conversation or observation.
Wheeler vs. Newton, supra. At page 14 in his deposition
the following question was asked A. E. Upton by counsel
for the defendant :

Q. When you called to Mr. A. E. Upton's attention the scheduling of his debt, what did he
say1
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Are you talking about
the $301
MR. ROBERTS: The $30 debt, yes.
A. What he actually did say, it was something
more or less to the effect that it was a joke. He
said, ''He owes me a lot more than that.''
Q. Do you recall when you talked to him about
that~
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A. No, I don't. I won't attempt to fix any
dates 13 or 14 years ago unless I have something
on which I can set it.
At the bottom of page 16 of the deposition, the testimony is as follows :
Q. Is it your recollection that it was shortly

after he got back that the matter of Heiselt was
discussed with him~ The proceedings in Alamosa.
A. I haven't said they were discussed. They
would be reported to him - approval of the claim
and the amount would be reported, and of course
Mr. Land, who was with me and the witness, had
with him the bank record and knew it all and
was there all the time-probably he told A. E.
before I did.
Q. But you recall telling him?

A. No.
Q. You recall reporting it at a board of

directors

meeting~

A. l wouldn't say I reported it; I would say
it was discussed there. It, naturally, would be.
Q. And in the presence of l\1r. A. E. Upton!

A. He was there, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That's all.
THE WITNESS : If you're trying to get me
to tell about any bank meetings 13 to 15 years ago,
you know I can't remember them.
MR. ROBERTS: No, I don't sir. Sometimes
we do, you know. Or, in any event in the ordinary routine of things we can say they were .
. TH~ WITNESS: In the ordinary routine of
things It would be discussed at a meeting and a
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thing like this would be called up but there
wouldn't be anything to discuss after it was reported, if you speak of the first report. Everybody kne'v the claim was allowed ; there wasn't
anything to do for the time being.
Q. (By

~Ir.

Roberts) Would any progress
reports be made as to what happened- some
watch kept of the thing1
A. Very little.
Q. But there would be some, even though very
little~

A. It might be mentioned at meetings. You
couldn't tell what might occasion it. Bankruptcies
run a long time and there isn't anything you can
do beyond proving your claim.
There 'vas no testimony given as to when the Board
of Directors' meeting was held at which the bankruptcy
was reported. Certainly there is no evidence that it was
held before June 21, 1941.
It is very noticeable upon examination of the depositions of A. E. Upton and Ernest B. Upton that counsel
for the defendant did not ask questions which might have
been asked to definitely determine the time when certain
claimed conversations took place or to determine the time
when the Board of Directors' meetings were held at
which the bankruptcy proceedings were discussed. The
Board of Directors' meeting at which the bankruptcy
proceedings were discussed might very likely have been
held many months after June 21, 1941. Any conclusion
as to the time when any of these events occurred must
be reached by supposition and speculation. A creditor's
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claim should not be defeated in a situation such as this
where one must speeulate and guess and read into the
testimony things that are not there in order to come to
the conclusion that the creditor in this case had "actual
knowledge of the ptoceedings in bankruptcy," prior to
June 21, 1941.
In summary of this point may we say that the
failure on the part of L. H. Heiselt to schedule his obligation to A. E. Upton under the particular circumstances
of this case, should prevent the defendant from avoiding
the obligation of paying off the judgment involved in
this case. In addition, thereto, it is clear that the evidence
does not sustain the finding of the trial court. There is
no evidence that A. E. Upton received a notice from the
Bankruptcy Court. Certainly the defendant .did not sustain the burden of proof in connection with the entry of
appearance made by Rafael J. Moses. Rafael J. Moses
admitted he did not get the authorization of A. E. Upton.
Ernest B. Upton, the defendant's own witness, denied
having given him authorization. At no place in their
depositions did A. E. Upton or Ernest B. Upton give
testimony sho,ving that A. E. Upton gained ''actual
knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy" "rithin time
in which to perfect his claim, before June 21, 1941.
D. THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IS
BASED WAS NOT A PROVABLE DEBT IN
BANKRU:PTCY WHEN BANKRUPTCY WAS
INSTITUTED.
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Plaintiff contends that the debt 'vhich is the basis
of the judgment in the case at bar \vas not a provable
debt against L. H. Heiselt personally at the time he filed
his original petition in bankruptcy, so as to allow the
creditor to file the claim and make proof thereof in
bankruptcy. The debt was too contingent to require
scheduling or filing by a creditor. The mortgagor in the
mortgage and the principal maker in the note is Heiselt
Construction Company, one of the defendants, and the
bankrupt debtor, L-. H. Heiselt another defendant, is an
endorser on the said note. At the time of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy the creditor, A. E. Upton, had
not exhausted his remedies against the mortgagor and
the principal maker of the note. Even if the creditor,
A. E. Upton, had had notice of the bankruptcy proceedings in time to file and prove this debt, it is submitted
that he could not have filed and proved and had allowed
in the Bankruptcy Court the claim against the bankrupt
debtor as a surety on the note which was secured by the
mortgage of the Heiselt Construction Company. If one
assumes that he had had notice and had filed or scheduled the claim in the Bankruptcy Court, the Bankruptcy
Court no doubt would have ruled that it was too contingent and not a provable debt at that time against the
bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt, because the remedies against
the mortgagor and principal maker on foreclosure of
the mortgage was necessary to the accruing of any debt
thereunder against the bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt. rrhe fact
is that A. E. Upton in the case at bar filed the action to
foreclose the mortgage and the Heiselt Construction
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Company pleaded the Statute of Limitations to defeat
the claim- against it and "\vhen that decision was made
in the Third Judicial District Court in and· for the State
of Utah, the liability against the surety L. H. Heiselt,
was then first determined and the exact amount thereof
was then, and not until then, definite, due and payable
by the surety ·L. H. Heiselt, the bankrupt debtor. It is
to be noted from the schedules in bankruptcy placed in
evidence in this matter, (Ex~ lA) that L. H. Heiselt
owned all of the shares of the Heiselt Construction Company, except two qualifying shares and that, therefore,
it was in L. H. Heiselt 's power to a,nd L. H. Heiselt did
plead the Statute of !..~imitations for the Heiselt Construction Company so as to bar the recovery against the
Heiselt Construction Company and bring into being this
liability against himself personally as a surety on the
debt of the judgment issuing out of the Third Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah, herein, on the 7th
day of June, 1948. L. H. Heiselt could, in this matter
if he had so de~ired, allowed the foreclosure proceedings
to go ·w·ithout the pleading of the Statute of Limitations
on behalf of the Heiselt Construction Company and the
plaintiff, A. E. Upton, then would have realized on the
debt through the ordinary course of the foreclosure on
the real estate.
Attention of the court is directed to the fact that
this is not a case of endorser on an unsecured note, but
is a. case where there is a note secured by a real estate
mortgage and the bankrupt debtor in this c~se is a
surety on such a secured obligation.
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In Re Lehrenkrauss, 14 Fed. Supp. 682, 684, 685, the
court held:
'' . . . As to that the court said : ''The engagement of Merrill and Baker was a guaranty. It
was not a contract to pay at all events, but a
contract that Brainard & Co. (the subsidiary)
could pay, and pay what 1 Not necessarily the
full amount of the debt, but any deficiency arising
from the sale of the collateral (which had been
posted by the subsidiary). Brainard & Co. were
not called upon to pay until demand had been
made, and I perceive but one answer to the inquiry - could any action have been maintained
on the contract against Merrill & Baker on the
day of bankruptcy~ Such action would clearly
have been premature. If that action was premature, then no provable claim existed. On this
subject there is nothing to add to the review of
the _cases contained in Re: Inman (D. C.) 171
Fed. 185 ...
''The opinion says : 'It cannot be contended
that the bankrupt's contract to idemnify had reopened or become absolute at the time he filed his
petition.' ''
The court's attention is called to the fact that the
bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt, petitioned the Bankruptcy Court
in October of 1947, to hear this matter in that court and
the fact that that court decided that it was a matter for
the State Court corroborates the contention that it was
not a provable debt in bankruptcy.
In Peterson v. Johnson Nut Company, (1939) 283 N.
W. 561, 204 Minn. 300, the court held that, ''So long as
it remains uncertain whether contract or liability will
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ever give rise to actual duty of liability, and there is no
means of removing uncertainty by calculation, the claim
is too conti~gent to be provable as a 'debt' in bankruptcy.''
Therefore, it is submitted that under the circumstances of a case where there is a real estate mortgage
and note \Vherein the mortgagor and principal maker was
not the bankrupt and the bankrupt was the endorser of
the note, it is too contingent· to be a provable debt
against the bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt at the time of the
filing of his petition in bankruptcy and that, therefore,
the discharge in bankruptcy of the defendant herein,
L·. H. Heiselt, did not and does not include the debt which
. is the basis of the judgment that was issued out of the
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah and
was affirmed by this court on this matter on the 7th day
of J nne, 1948.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted:
First: That the lo,ver court. herein should have
recognized that the jurisdiction of the County Court of
Conejos County, State of Colorado, in the matter of the
Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, had attached in all
respects as to the matters herein at issue and that that
probate court was a competent court to decide the
rna tter; and that, therefore, the lower court in this case
should have dismissed the substituted defendant's motion
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for a stay of execution upon grounds of conflicting jurisdiction.
Second: That the lower court should have ruled that
the matter had been fully adjudicated at the instance of
the defendant (bankrupt debtor) on at least two occasions in the United States District Court for the State
of Colorado, in bankruptcy; and upon such grounds
should have disallowed the substituted defendant's
motion to stay execution. The lower court failed to recognize that the _Bankruptcy Court had its entire file at its
disposal with respect to ''notice or actual knowledge''
of any creditor and on two occasions at the instance of
the defendant (bankrupt debtor) herein ruled contrary
to him with respect to the controversy.
Third: The lower court erred in finding, from the
evidence, that the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, had received
"notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings" in time to file his claim. The defendant had the
burden of showing positively that the plaintiff had
"notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings'' and failed to do so. If there is any question under
the evidence presented by a debtor interposing a technical bar, the question should be resolved in favor of the
creditor. The lower court erred in that it apparently
allowed supposition and speculation to influence its findIngs.
Fourth: That the lower court should have found that
the debt upon which the judgment herein is based was,
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at the time of the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings, too contingent to be provable, especially where, as
in this case, the bankrupt is an endorser on a note that
is secured by a mortgage on real estate.
It is submitted, therefore, that the decision of the
lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

WM. J. CHRISTENSEN
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
Counsel for
Plaintiff-.Appellant
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